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AN OBSCURED EXPANSION OF
THE COMMERCE POWER
JASON WOJCIECHOWSKI*

INTRODUCTION

The so-called "federalism revolution" of the Rehnquist Su
preme Court! struck fear in the hearts of some scholars. They wor
ried that long-standing federal antidiscrimination laws, such as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),2 might be held un
constitutional because of the revolution's new levels of judicial
scrutiny of Congress's attempts to exercise its legislative power,3

* JD candidate, 2008, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Yeshiva University).
Thanks to Professors Michelle Adams, Margaret Lemos, and Julie Suk, as well as
Austen Rachlis, for their guidance and comments.
1. The phrase "federalism revolution" refers to the perceived program of the Su
preme Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist to place limitations on the exercise
of federal power, particularly federal legislative power. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045,
1051 (2001) ("[Bush v. Gore] occurred against the background of a veritable revolution
in constitutional doctrine that has been going on for some fifteen years. "); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1 (2004); Larry D. Kramer,
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 138 (2001) ("The real revolution began
in 1995, when for the first time in six decades the Court struck down a federal statute as
exceeding the limits of the Commerce Clause."). But see Keith E. Whittington, Taking
What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477,477
(2001) (describing the "recent federalism cases" as "not quite amounting to a
revolution ").
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (2000).
3. See Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and the Contrivances of Public Law, 77 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 523, 566-70 (2003) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's likely approach to
the question of Title VII's constitutionality and concluding that overturning the statute
"would be a logical result of the ... Court's new federalism"); Sylvia A. Law, In the
Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70
U. CiN. L. REV. 367, 385 (2002) ("[T]he Court's decision in Garrett strongly suggests
that federal legislative protection of civil rights and liberties will no longer be tolerated
by the Supreme Court majority."); James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality:
How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91 (2000); James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free
Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 525, 526 (2004) ("Could Title VII be the next victim of the states' rights revolu
tion?"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE LJ. 1141,1143
44 (2002) (arguing that federalism concerns were merely a "stalking-horse" for the
Court's actions against the national antidiscrimination program); Louis J. Virelli III &
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particularly under the Commerce Clause. 4 Because Title VII's en
actment was at least partially based on the Commerce Clause,5 the
Court's willingness to scale back Congress's ability to regulate pur
suant to its commerce power created this anxiety of judicial cancel
lation of the national antidiscrimination scheme. 6 The Supreme
Court cases of United States v. Lopez 7 and United States v. Morri
son 8 are the main sources of this concern. Both cases struck down
congressional action as transcending the boundaries of the Com
merce Clause. Morrison is particularly worrisome for those favor
ing broad congressional authority in the antidiscrimination realm
because the statute at issue concerned gender-motivated violence.
More recently, the Court decided Raich v. Gonzalez,9 which held
that a statute regulating, inter alia, intrastate growth of marijuana
was a proper exercise of the commerce power. 10 These potentially
David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or Not": The New Commerce
Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v.
Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 926 (2001) ("[T]he interpretive preferences of the
Morrison Court squarely threaten future congressional attempts to address civil rights
violations, as they have proven unable to provide principled and intelligible judicial
standards for Congress to follow in drafting such legislation."); see also Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Dis
crimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 944 (2004) (noting the possibility that the Court
might be "beginning a general retreat from the prohibition of rational discrimination it
previously staked out").
4. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States"); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 1376
("[T]he Rehnquist Court has repudiated the New Deal's judicial presumption of consti
tutionality and restored heightened scrutiny [of Congress's exercise of Article I pow
ers]."); infra Part I.B (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
5. The other source of power relied upon by Congress in enacting Title VII was
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 367 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Title VII
was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and [Section] 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also infra Part I.C (describing limitations on the
power of Congress to enact legislation using Section 5 and reconciling the statement in
Bakke with the current Section 5 jurisprudence).
6. Because of their similar structure and purported constitutional bases, statutes
cast into doubt alongside Title VII include the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.c. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c.
§§ 621-634 (2000); and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. See
infra note 22 (discussing the structural similarities between the federal antidiscrimina
tion statutes).
7. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
8. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Lopez and Morrison are discussed in more depth in
fra Part LB.
9. Raich v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
10. Id. at 12-33.
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contradictory rulings have generated confusion as to the scope of
Congress's commerce power.
While Title VII may not actually be in danger, any hint from
the Court regarding the scope of Congress's commerce power re
mains welcome, particularly in light of the confusion raised by
Raich. The recent case of Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.11 appears on
the surface to have scant relevance to these federalism concerns.
While the case involved Title VII, neither party challenged the con
stitutionality of the statute. Rather, the question before the Court
was whether the requirement that an employer have fifteen or more
employees in order to be governed by the statute describes a limita
tion on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courtS.12 The
11. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
12. Id. at 503 ("The question ... is whether the numerical qualification contained
in Title VII's definition of 'employer' affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction
...."). The other alternative is that the fifteen-employee requirement is an element of
the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. (describing the other possible classification of the
"numerical qualification" as "delineat[ing] a substantive ingredient of a Title VII claim
for relief").
The distinction at stake in Arbaugh between a jurisdiction- or claim-oriented inter
pretation has a variety of consequences. Even beyond putting aside the constitutional
impact argued by this Article, these consequences make it important that courts have a
clear idea of whether they are dealing with a jurisdiction or merit issue.
First, if an element is part of the plaintiff's cause of action, and not a matter of
subject-matter jurisdiction, then the defendant might waive the right to raise a failure to
satisfy that element. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h). In the Title VII context, this means that
an employer with fewer than fifteen employees who does not raise that issue in a timely
manner may be deemed to have waived the right to do so. Because the Supreme Court
in Arbaugh held that the employee-numerosity requirement is, in fact, a part of the
plaintiff's cause of action, Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516, the defendant employer's failure to
make a motion for dismissal on the grounds that it did not have fifteen employees
before judgment had been rendered precluded its ability to do so at all. Thus, the judg
ment against it, pursuant to Title VII, will stand despite the fact that it does not actually
fall within the regulatory confines of that statute.
While the waiver issue seems likely to come up only in this context, it is conceiva
ble that an employer might intentionally waive a defense that it had fewer than fifteen
employees in order to stay in federal court if it had a reasonable certainty of prevailing
on the merits in that court. A situation where this could arise is where an employee
brings not only a Title VII action, but also supplemental claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(2000) (granting the federal courts "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy"), based on state antidiscrimination law, where the
state law defines "employer" less restrictively than Title VII. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 292(5) (McKinney 2006) ("The term 'employer' does not include any employer with
fewer than four persons in his employ." (emphasis added)). If the employer in such
situation feels confident that it will prevail on the merits of these claims in federal court
but will lose on the merits of the state law claim in state court, then it may prefer to
avoid having the Title VII claim dismissed and, instead, remain mum about its number
of employees.
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Court answered that question in the negative,B eliminating a split
among the circuits I4 and putting to rest a non-earth-shattering, but
nonetheless important, question. 15 Part I of this Article sets out
these background materials. First, the employee-numerosity re
quirement and jurisdictional element of Title VII are described and
their relation to Arbaugh is elucidated. Next, the Supreme Court's
recent Commerce Clause cases are explored in some depth. Fi
nally, this Part discusses the line of cases establishing that Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 5) does not give Congress
the power to regulate private activity.
This Article will argue in Parts II and III that Arbaugh can be
read as standing for more than a simple clarification of the scope of
federal court jurisdiction with respect to Title VII. Instead,
Second, if an element goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,
then those courts have a duty to raise the issue sua sponte if it appears that the element
might not be satisfied. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action."). In the above situation, then, where the employer with less
than fifteen employees wants to remain in federal court, and if the employee-numer
osity requirement was jurisdictional, the judge could dismiss the case on her own initia
tive. Because of Arbaugh, however, this is not the case. The judge would be forced to
let the case remain in her courtroom unless the defendant made a motion to dismiss.
Finally, the same illustration also shows the impact on supplemental jurisdiction. If
a plaintiff brings state law claims in federal court pursuant to the federal courts' supple
mental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed, the outcome with regard to the
state claims is partially determined by the manner in which the federal claims were
dismissed. If the federal claims were dismissed for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction,
then the court has no authority to hear the state law claims. See 28 U.S.c. § 1367(a).
The district courts are permitted to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy." Id. Thus, if there is no claim in the
action over which the district court has original jurisdiction, no supplemental jurisdic
tion can be exercised. If, however, the federal claims were dismissed on the merits,
then the court is permitted to exercise its discretion as to whether it should retain the
remaining state law claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [supplemental] claim ... if the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction ...." (emphasis added».
13. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504 ("[T]he employee-numerosity requirement relates
to the substantive adequacy of [the plaintiff's] Title VII claim ....").
14. See Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Em
ployee Thresholds in Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049
54 (2005) (describing the circuit split on this issue). The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits all held the employee-numerosity requirement to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Id. at 1050. The Third and Seventh Circuits held the requirement to
go to the merits of the plaintiff's case. Id. at 1050-52. Finally, the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits use a "hybrid" approach. Id. at 1052-53. However, this approach turns out in
the end to really be a disguised "merits" approach. Id. at 1053-54.
15. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 514-16 (describing some of the consequences of label
ing a restricting element as "jurisdictional" or "merits").
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Arbaugh is consistent with the Court's suggestion in Raich that the
federalism revolution did not take away as much of Congress's
power as may have been believed after Lopez and Morrison. Fur
ther, an examination of all of the consequences of Arbaugh's rule
reveals that it is more than merely consistent with Raich; rather, it
demonstrates that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause
to regulate any activity that it can reasonably construe as economic,
even though that power was seemingly restricted by Lopez and
Morrison. This reading of Arbaugh is driven by the connection be
tween the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear a case and Congress's
power to grant such jurisdiction. That is, in order for federal courts
to have legitimate subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal statu
tory cause of action, Congress must have the constitutional power
to create that cause of action,16 Part IV goes on to explore what
this argument means for our understanding of the balance of power
between Congress and the Supreme Court, concluding that Con
gress may have broader commerce power than previously thought.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Arbaugh and Title VII

Arbaugh involved a Title VII claim against a private em
ployerP Title VII bars discrimination by employers on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."18 The employee was
a waitress and bartender at a small New Orleans restaurant who
alleged that her employer sexually harassed her, which led to her
constructive discharge. 19 While the issue did not arise at first, the
small size of the defendant restaurant would later become the key
point in the case because Title VII does not cover every employer
in the country. Rather, to be subject to the statute, an employer
must meet the statutory definition of "employer." That definition
contains two restrictions that are relevant here: the "employee
numerosity requirement" and the "jurisdictional element. "20 The
16. This connection is fleshed out and justified infra Part II.
17. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503-04.
18. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
19. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 507. As to "constructive discharge," see Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129,134 (2004) ("[T]o establish 'constructive discharge,'
the plaintiff ... must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable
that her resignation qualified as a fitting response. ").
20. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b). The "jurisdictional element" is sometimes referred
to as the "jurisdictional hook." See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the
Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2101 (2006). Other portions of the statutory definition
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employee-numerosity requirement is that an employer must have
fifteen or more employees to fall within the confines of the stat
ute. 21 The jurisdictional element states that the employer must be
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce."22 The purpose of this
include exceptions for, inter alia, the United States and private clubs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b )(1 )-(2).

21. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b).
22. Id. The employee-numerosity requirement and jurisdictional element in Title
VII are structurally the same as the analogous requirements in other federal antidis
crimination legislation, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fam
ily and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).
The ADA outlaws employment discrimination on the basis of disability. Id.
§ 12,112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application proce
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."). It wholly incor
porates a variety of sections from Title VII, including the provision granting jurisdiction
to the federal courts. Id. § 12,117(a) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth
in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the pow
ers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the At
torney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of any provision of this chapter ...."). The incorporation of the jurisdiction
granting provision is a true redundancy because the federal question jurisdiction statute
had been amended in 1980, ten years before the passage of the ADA, to eliminate the
amount-in-controversy requirement. See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486,
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.c. § 1331 to remove the amount in controversy
requirement). As in Title VII, the ADA's definitions are in a separate section. See 42
U.S.c. § 12,111. Further definitions are included in yet another section. See id. § 12102
(providing the definition for the ADA); 42 U.S.c. § 12,102(1) (defining the terms "aux
iliary aids and services"); id. § 12,102(2), (defining the term "disability"); id. § 12,102(3)
(defining "State"). "Employer" is defined, as in Title VII, to mean a person with fifteen
or more employees. Id. § 12,111(5)(A). This was the original limitation when the stat
ute was first enacted in 1990. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101
336, § 101(5)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 330. The jurisdictional hook, in the same section, uses
the same wording as Title VII. 42 U.S.c. § 12,111(5)(A) ("The term 'employer' means
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ...."). Thus, the ADA is identical
to Title VII in the portions of the statute at issue in Arbaugh.
The ADEA bars discrimination in employment on the basis of age. 29 U.S.c.
§ 623(a) (making it unlawful to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ
ual's age"). The Act does not explicitly grant jurisdiction to the federal courts, but it
does create a private right of action. Id. § 626(c)(1) ("Any person aggrieved may bring
a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as
will effectuate the purposes of this chapter ...."). This right of action combines with 28
U.s.c. § 1331, granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over "civil actions arising
under the ... laws ... of the United States," to give the federal courts the power to hear
ADEA cases. The statute, as contrasted with Title VII, see supra text accompanying
notes 18-20, does not appear to have granted jurisdiction over all ADEA cases until 28
U.S.c. § 1331 was amended to eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement. The
definition of "employer," as in the other statutes, is in a separate section. See 29 U.S.c.
§ 630(b). ADEA defines an "employer" as a person having twenty or more employees
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latter element is to provide a nexus to interstate commerce so as to
ensure that the statute is only applied in cases over which Congress
has legitimate constitutional regulatory power under the Commerce
Clause. 23
Weighty issues of constitutionality and the scope of federal leg
islative power were not explicitly raised by the parties to the litiga
tion. The question presented to the Court, on which the circuits
had previously split,24 was seemingly a minor technical issue: Is Ti
tle VII's employee-numerosity requirement a limitation on federal
subject-matter jurisdiction or is it a part of the plaintiff's cause of
action?25 Referring to the question presented as "minor" is not to
denigrate the importance of the decision in this case. The answer to
the question posed in the litigation has numerous consequences for,
and the jurisdictional element again uses the same language as that found in Title VII.
Jd. ('''[E]mployer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ...."). As with Title VII, the ADEA's
original employee-numerosity requirement was twenty-five. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § l1(b), 81 Stat. 602, 605. This was amended to
the current number in 1974. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, § 28(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 74.
Finally, the FMLA entitles employees to take medical leave without loss of their
jobs or benefits. 29 U.S.c. § 2614(a)(1) ("[A]ny eligible employee who takes leave
under [the FMLA] shall be entitled, on return from such leave-(A) to be restored ...
to the position of employment held ... when the leave commenced; or (B) ... an
equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits"); id. § 2614(a)(2) ("The tak
ing of leave under [the FMLA] shall not result in the loss of any employment benefit
accrued prior to the date on which the leave commenced."). As in the ADEA, the
FMLA does not have an explicit jurisdiction-granting provision, instead it relies on 28
U.S.c. § 1331 combined with a statutory private right of action. /d. § 2617(a)(2) ("An
action to recover ... damages or equitable relief ... may be maintained against any
employer ... in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction."). The definition
of "employer" is again found in a separate section. Jd. § 2611(4)(A). An "employer"
for FMLA purposes is one that has at least fifty employees. Jd. § 2611(4)(A)(i). This
number is the same as when the statute was originally passed. Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(4)(A)(i), 107 Stat. 6, 8. In the FMLA,
however, the jurisdictional hook is slightly different from that found in the other three
statutes. Here, it states that the employer must be "engaged in commerce or in any
industry or activity affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). This jurisdictional
element appears slightly broader than that of the other statutes as a result of the "or
activity" language not found in the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII hooks. This difference
will not playa role in the analysis to follow, however.
23. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[A] jurisdictional element
... would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity) in question affects
interstate commerce."); see also Stuckey, supra note 20, at 2102 ("A jurisdictional hook
is a statutory clause requiring that the regulated activity have a connection with inter
state commerce.").
24. See supra note 14.
25. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
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at the very least, antidiscrimination litigation. 26 This is particularly
true because of shared attributes of a variety of federal antidis
crimination statutes that make the Arbaugh decision applicable be
yond the Title VII context. 27
The issue of whether the employee-numerosity requirement is
jurisdictional arose because of the confusion regarding the number
of employees who worked at the restaurant. 28 After judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff, the employer raised, for the first time, the
fact that it had fewer than fifteen employees and thus could not
properly be found liable under Title VII.2 9 The employer claimed
that because it did not employ the requisite number of employees,
the district court never had subject-matter jurisdiction over the
case, and thus that the judgment had to be vacated. 3D The defen
dant's post-judgment motion for dismissal relied on Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which defines the defenses that a
party can raise to a claim, along with when and how those defenses
may be made. 31 The Rule 12(b)(1) defense of "lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter"32 relied on by the employer can be raised
at any time, by a party or by the court, even after judgment has
been entered. 33
The employee's argument in response was that the employee
numerosity requirement does not affect the jurisdiction of the fed
eral district courts,34 but rather it is an element of the plaintiff's
cause of action. Thus, a dismissal for failure to satisfy that element
would be for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
26. See supra note 12 (discussing the concrete consequences of the "jurisdiction
or merits" dichotomy).
27. See supra note 22 (discussing relevant similarities between Title VII and other
antidiscrimination legislation).
28. The statutory definition of "employee" is hardly free from ambiguity, as it
defines an employee merely as "an individual employed by an employer," 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e(f) (2000), which begs the question, among others, of what it means for someone
to be employed. In this case, the dispute was over whether delivery drivers, the owner
managers, and the spouses of the owners were employees within the meaning of the
statute. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 2003 WL 1797893, at *2
(E.D. La. Apr. 3,2003), affd, 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
29. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006).
30. See generally Memorandum in Support of Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-3376,
2002 WL 33000724 (E.D. La. Nov. 19,2002); Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Arbaugh, No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 2002 WL 33000724.
31. See FED. R. CJv. P. 12.
32. /d. at 12(b)(1).
33. Id. at 12(h)(3).
34. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 223 (5th Cir. 2004).
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granted."35 This defense, unlike the subject-matter jurisdiction de
fense, can be raised only before or during the trial.3 6 Thus if the
defense is not raised at that time, it is considered waived. 37
The trial court, bound by the precedent in the Fifth Circuit,38
found that the employee-numerosity requirement did in fact de
scribe a limitation on its subject-matter jurisdiction, and accordingly
found that the defense was not waived. 39 It ordered discovery on
the issue of the number of employees. 4o Upon finding that the em
ployer actually did not have the requisite number of employees, the
judge vacated the judgment and dismissed the case. 41
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the employee
numerosity requirement is an element of the plaintiff's cause of ac
tion, not a limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the fed
eral courtS.42 In so holding, it made much of the fact that Title
VII's jurisdiction-granting provision and employee-numerosity min
imum were contained in separate sections of the statute. 43 The
Court also pointed to '''unfair[ness)' and 'waste of judicial re
sources'" without further explanation. 44 This is likely a reference
to the idea that the employer should have raised this issue before or
at the trial instead of waiting until later. This resulted in the "un
fairness" that the employee had her judgment taken away and a
"waste of judicial resources" in having a full trial on the merits
when none was actually necessary.45
35. FED. R. CJv. P. 12(b)(6).
36. Id. at 12(h)(2) ("A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ... may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.").
37. E.g., Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 870 (4th
Cir. 1999) ("Essentially, [defendant] asserts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a
claim. But there is no authority for such a motion to be brought after trial.").
38. See Arbaugh, 380 F.3d at 223-25 (discussing Fifth Circuit precedent and af
firming the trial court's decision that the employee-numerosity requirement is
jurisdictional).
39. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 2003 WL 1797893, at *10,
(E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
40. Id. at *1.
41. Id. at *10.
42. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-14 (2006).
43. Id. at 515 ("[T]he [fifteen]-employee threshold appears in a separate provi
sion that 'does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of
the district courts.'" (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394
(1982))).
44. Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. at 47, Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
500 (No. 04-944».
45. See id.
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Finally, with no further reasoning than a statement that "the
ball" should be left "in Congress' court,"46 the Court laid down a
bright-line rule. 47 The Court stated that "when Congress does not
rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character."48 The
Court did not give reasons for this broad holding beyond those al
ready given for its narrower decision that the employee-numerosity
requirement is not jurisdictional. Furthermore, it decided not to
explain what it meant by the phrase "rank a statutory limitation on
coverage as jurisdictional."49 Nothing in the Court's statement of
the rule, therefore, prevents the applicability of the same rule to the
other limiting provision in Title VII's definition of "employer," the
jurisdictional element permitting application of Title VII only to
employers who are "engaged in an industry affecting commerce."50
This application of the bright-line rule will prove to have far-reach
ing consequences for the extent of Congress's power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause. 51
B.

The Commerce Clause Jurisprudence

The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce. 52 Although the entire history of the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is far beyond the scope of
this Article,53 this Part briefly discusses three recent, relevant cases
46. Id.
47. Id. at 516.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (2000). See infra Part III for a discussion of the impor
tance of the application of the Arbaugh bright-line rule to the jurisdictional element of
Title VII.
51. See infra Part III. Indeed, in the aftermath of Arbaugh, the lower federal
courts have applied the bright-line rule in a variety of contexts. See Minard v. ITC
DeJtacom Commc'n, Inc., 447 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the rule to the FMLA);
Partington v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying
the rule to the Securities Act of 1933); Sanders v. United States, No. 06-354, 2006 WL
2735248, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2006) (applying the rule to the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights).
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States.").
53. Any number of sources might provide the relevant background material. See,
e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807-17 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing interpretations of the Commerce Clause through three major epochs: pre
1887, 1887-1937, and 1937-1995).
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that interpret the Commerce Clause and set out the boundaries
within which Congress can regulate. 54
In 1995, the Court in United States v. Lopez declared a federal
statute unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds for the first
time since 1936,55 thus signaling to Congress an end of judicial per
missiveness of legislative action under the Commerce Clause that
had developed since the New Dea1. 56 The case concerned a statute
criminalizing gun possession near schools. 57 The Court drew a dis
tinction between economic and noneconomic activity: economic ac
tivity that substantially affected interstate commerce was within
Congress's commerce power, while noneconomic activity was nop8
The Court then decided that gun possession, the activity regulated
in the statute, is noneconomic, and thus could not be constitution
ally regulated by Congress. 59
Because the activity was noneconomic, the Court looked for
other bases on which Congress might be found to have legitimately
regulated gun possession, but found none. 60 The Court faulted
Congress for two failures in its drafting of the provision. First, the
statute did not contain a jurisdictional element that would allow a
court to decide as each case arose whether the firearm possession at
issue actually had an effect on interstate commerce. 61 Second, Con
gress had made no legislative findings that the type of gun posses
sion regulated by the statute had a substantial effect on interstate
54. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
55. Joseph D. Grano, Teaching the Commerce Clause, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1163,1164
n.3 (1998) ("[F]or the first time in sixty years, the Supreme Court invalidated a law as
exceeding Congress's commerce clause power."); Kramer, supra note 1, at 138 ("[F]or
the first time in six decades the Court struck down a federal statute as exceeding the
limits of the Commerce Clause."); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
56. Again, a full discussion of the depth and breadth of this permissiveness is
beyond the scope of this Article. The interested reader might consult TRIBE, supra note
53, at 811-17 (discussing the major Commerce Clause cases from NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), until just before Lopez).
57. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 ("In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Con
gress made it a federal offense 'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.'"
(quoting 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(I)(A) (Supp. V 1988))).
58. ld. at 559-61. The Court stated that this distinction between economic and
noneconomic activity was not new, but arose through an analysis of its prior cases,
which established a "pattern" that was "clear." ld. at 560.
59. ld. at 567.
60. ld. at 564-68.
61. ld. at 561; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdic
tional elements).
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commerce. 62 Thus, a noneconomic activity, without either evidence
that it affects interstate commerce or a jurisdictional element ensur
ing that the only cases over which federal power will be exercised
will be those involving interstate commerce, could not be validly
regulated under the Commerce Clause.
United States v. Morrison involved a provision in the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA),63 which established a federal cause
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence. 64 The case reaf
firmed and extended the principles espoused in Lopez. Although
Congress passed the VAWA before the Court decided Lopez,65 the
Act was accompanied by findings that specifically established Con
gress's view that gender-motivated violence affects interstate com
merce. 66 This evidence did not appease the Court, however. It
again found that the activity Congress attempted to regulate was
not economic in nature. 67 The Court also rejected the validity of
Congress's findings because the reasoning employed could be used
to show that nearly any activity has an effect on interstate com
merce, thus putting every aspect of citizens' lives within the reach of
congressional regulation. 68 Furthermore, the Court noted, as in Lo
62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("[T]o the extent that congressional findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially
affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the
naked eye, they are lacking here."):
63. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2000), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
64. Id. § 13,981(c) ("A person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender and thus deprives another of the right [to be free from crimes of violence moti
vated by gender] shall be liable to the party injured ....").
65. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 40,302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941-42.
66. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("In contrast with the lack of congressional findings
that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the seri
ous impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families."); see, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853
("Congress has found that ... crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial
adverse effect on interstate commerce[] by deterring potential victims from traveling
interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting
with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence moti
vated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce[ ] by dimin
ishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the
supply of and the demand for interstate products ....").
67. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity.").
68. Id. at 615 ("Congress' findings are substantially weakened by the fact that
they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unwork
able if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers.... Given these
findings ... the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Com
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pez, that there was no jurisdictional element to save the constitu
tionality of the statute. 69
The Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence continued
on this course for just five years. In 2005, the Court decided Raich
v. Gonzales with a result contrary to those in Lopez and Morrison:
The federal statute under attack was not struck down as represent
ing an overreaching of the Commerce Clause power. 70 Raich dealt
with the question of whether application of the Controlled Sub
stances Act (CSA)71 was a valid exercise of the commerce power.72
Federal agents acting pursuant to the CSA seized and destroyed a
California resident's marijuana plants. 73 The plants were grown for
personal medical use, which was permitted by California state
law.7 4
Despite the contrary outcome, Raich neither overruled the re
sults reached nor repudiated the approach employed in Morrison
and Lopez. 75 The decision relied first on the fact that there is an
interstate market for marijuana, and thus growing the plants, even
for personal use, was an economic activity. Second, it rested on the
fact that the CSA was a comprehensive statute, regUlating in-state
possession as a mere incident of its larger regulation of controlled
substances. 76 The majority opinion therefore did not subject the
CSA to the kind of scrutiny employed by the Court in the earlier
two cases. First, the concept of a "jurisdictional element" is not
mentioned in the majority opinion. Second, discussion of Con
merce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national
and local authority seems well founded."). The Court quoted VAWA's legislative his
tory to show the objectionable reasoning. Id. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 103-711, at 385).
69. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that VAWA "contains no jurisdictional ele
ment establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce").
70. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
71. 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-971 (2000).
72. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 ("The question presented in this case is whether the
[commerce] power ... includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of
marijuana in compliance with California law.").
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
75. See Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705,719 (2006)
("Although the Raich majority did not apply or mention Lopez's test, it treated Lopez
as established law and did not claim to overrule either Lopez or Morrison.").
76. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 ("[R]espondents are cultivating, for home consumption,
a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate mar
ket."). The Lopez and Morrison opinions, by contrast, had found that gun possession
near schools and gender-motivated violence were not economic activities. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561
(1995).
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gress's findings regarding the effects of drug manufacturing and dis
tribution were confined to a footnote 77 and deemed valid in just
one sentence,78 in sharp contrast to Morrison's scrutiny of the mode
of analysis of the congressional record. 79 Further, in response to
the complaint that Congress did not make specific findings regard
ing intrastate activities involving marijuana, the Court stated that
particularized findings were not necessary. 80
The final outcome, in terms of being able to predict what will
happen in the next Commerce Clause case to arise, is uncertain.
The decisive factor in the recent cases appears to be the economic
nature of the activity Congress seeks to regulate. However, while
Lopez, Morrison, and Raich taken as a whole support this view, it
has remained unclear whether this distinction will hold up, in no
small part because of the apparent ideological divisions of the
Court that decided these three cases. Lopez and Morrison were
both decided by five-to-four vote, with the same arrangement of
votes in each. 81 The majority in Raich, though, consisted of the
four Lopez and Morrison dissenters along with one member of the
majority from those cases. 82 It would thus be easy to characterize
these decisions as the product of two groups of ideologues, or even
political partisans,83 with one group voting consistently to uphold
77.
78.

See Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-13 n.20.
See id. at 20 ("Findings in the introductory sections of the CSA explain why

Congress deemed it appropriate to encompass local activities within the scope of the
CSA.").
79. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
80. Raich, 545 U.S. at 21.
81. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550. The majority in each
case was formed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas. Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented. This split of
votes, furthermore, is the same as that displayed in a variety of important cases in re
cent years. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,429 (2004) ("enemy combatant"
case); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (definition of "supervi
sor" in the National Labor Relations Act); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (right to
counsel); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,358 (2001) (Section 5
and the Americans with Disabilities Act); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (presiden
tial election of 2000).
82. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 3-4. Justice Kennedy switched sides. Justice Scalia also
voted to uphold the statute, but concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I agree with the Court's holding that the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) may validly be applied to respondents' cultivation, distribution, and possession
of marijuana for personal, medicinal use.").
83. For some, Bush v. Gore illustrated the partisan nature of that Court's mem
bers. See, e.g., Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REv. 425,471 (2003) ("Therein lies the
significance of Bush [v. Gore] as well, because the Court's selection of a Republican
candidate insures that the controlling coalition will remain intact for years to come.");
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congressional exercise of Commerce Clause power and the other
group voting, wherever reasonably feasible, to restrict such exer
cise. 84 The question of where the Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is going, particularly with the departure of two members of the
Court that decided these three cases,85 is thus very much up in the
air. 86 Gleaning hints about the Court's stance on the commerce
power from sources such as Arbaugh 87 may help clear the picture.
C.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

Congressional power to regulate small intrastate employers to
promote its antidiscrimination ideals might not depend solely on
the Commerce Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
"equal protection of the laws"88 to all citizens and, in Section 5,
gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions" of the Amendment. 89 Thus, it is possible that Con
gress could act to prevent discrimination regardless of the effect on
interstate commerce through the Section 5 power. This is particu
larly true because the Section 5 power is broader than the ability to
simply restate the Amendment. That is, Congress may employ the
Section 5 power to pass legislation prohibiting conduct that is not
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737,
737-38 (2001) ("The conclusion that emerges, in my view, is that several members of the
Court-perhaps a majority-were determined to overturn any ruling of the Florida Su
preme Court that was favorable to Vice President Gore, at least if that ruling signifi
cantly enhanced the Vice President's chances of winning the election.").
84. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It's Not Just
a Battle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081,
2081 (2006) ("The four moderate-to-liberal Justices on what was the Rehnquist Court
have countered the federalism revival at every turn. They even have indicated a desire
to overturn aspects of it if they obtain a fifth vote."); Nelson Lund, Fig Leaf Federalism
and Tenth Amendment Exceptionalism, 22 CaNsT. COMMENT. 11, 15 (2005) ("(J]ust as
the federalist dissenters in Garcia refused to accept defeat, so the nationalist dissenters
in these cases have vowed to continue a fight in which they expect eventually to
prevail. ").
85. Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away in September 2005 and Justice
O'Connor retired in January 2006. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at
80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 13934870 (Westlaw).
86. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitu
tion in Exile, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 670 (2006) ("Until United States v. Lopez you
could not argue the Commerce Clause; after Gonzales v. Raich, it is not clear you can
argue the Commerce Clause anymore." (citation omitted»; Lund, supra note 84, at 15
("The reach of Lopez and Morrison may turn out to be extremely narrow. That at least
appears to be the implication of the 6-3 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which seems to
limit Lopez and Morrison . ..." (emphases added) (citation omitted».
87. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2000).
88. U.S. CaNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. Id. § 5.
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itself unconstitutional.9° However, the Court has never permitted
an interpretation of the Section 5 power that reaches private actors,
and thus any power Congress has to regulate the private actors
made subject to Title VII must come from the Commerce Clause.
While the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
may have been to allow regulation of all activity, public or private,
that violated the civil liberties of citizens,91 the Supreme Court
quickly established that such a broad reading of the Amendment
would not carry the day. Seven years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held in United States v. Cruik
shank92 that the Amendment "adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another."93 Rather, it protects individuals against
violations of individual rights by the states only.94 Four years later,
the Court reiterated this view in Virginia v. Rives ,95 writing, "The
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution ...
have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of
private individuals."96
While Cruikshank and Rives did not discuss Section 5 explic
itly, two 1883 cases showed that the state-action principle applied to
that section as well. First was United States v. Harris ,97 in which
Justice Woods quoted extensively from Cruikshank and also cited
Rives favorably.98 The Court in Harris firmly stated that the statute
could not be supported "by any clause in the Fourteenth Amend
ment," because it was directed solely at private activity.99
Finally came the Civil Rights Cases .100 At stake was the first
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which mandated that citi
zens be given the same treatment at places like inns and theaters,
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("Section 5 is 'a
positive grant of legislative power' that includes authority to 'prohibi[t] conduct which
is not itself unconstitutional and [to] intrud[e] into "legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States. ",,, (citations omitted) (quoting first Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); quoting second City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 518 (1997))).
91. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1329-33 (1952).
92. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
93. Id. at 554.
94. Id.
95. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
96. Id. at 318.
97. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
98. Id. at 638-39.
99. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
100. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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regardless of race. IOI Congress had relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment in passing this statute. 102 The Court, however, reiter
ated that the Fourteenth Amendment was effective only against
state action.103 Section 5 was dismissed as a possible ground on
which Congress might rely to justify the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act because Section 5 merely grants Congress the right
"[t]o adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such
prohibited State law and State acts, and thus to render them effectu
ally null, void, and innocuous."104 Thus Congress could not regu
late the private owners of the inns and theaters under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1966, there was some hope that the Court might move to a
broader reading of Section 5 after the Court decided United States
v. Guest.1° 5 Guest discussed 18 U.S.c. § 241, which makes it illegal
to conspire to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person
... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege se
cured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."106
In deciding the case, the Court noticeably said nothing about Sec
tion 5.1°7 However, a majority of the Justices did, in separate opin
ions, express their views as to the breadth of Section 5. Justice
Clark, joined by two other Justices, wrote in his concurrence that
"the specific language of [Section] 5 empowers the Congress to en
act laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action
that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."108 Justice Bren
nan, also joined by two other Justices, used similar though slightly
less bald language in his concurring and dissenting opinion.109 Be
101. [d. at 8-9.
102. [d. at 10. The Commerce Clause jurisprudence of that time had not yet de
veloped to the pro-federal power heights it reached after the New Deal. See TRIBE,
supra note 53, at 811-17.
103. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 ("It is state action of a particular character
that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment.").
104. [d. (emphasis added).
105. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
106. 18 U.S.c. § 241 (2000).
107. Guest, 383 U.S. at 755 ("[N]othing said in this opinion goes to the question
of what kinds of other and broader legislation Congress might constitutionally enact
under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to implement that Clause ....").
108. [d. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
109. [d. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Section]
5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to pro
tect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully
empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the
exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection." (emphasis added)).

494

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:477

cause there was no overlap in the Justices joining the Clark and
Brennan opinions, six Justices appeared to support the idea that
Section 5 could be used to regulate private activity.1 10
However, neither that Court nor any future Court had de
clared those views to be law by 2000, when Morrison was decided.
The five-Justice majority in Morrison favorably cited Harris and the
Civil Rights Cases ll1 while dismissing the opinions of the six Jus
tices in Guest as mere dicta, stating, with an air of hauteur, that
"[t]his is simply not the way that reasoned constitutional adjudica
tion proceeds."112 Thus, the majority not only held that the civil
rights remedy of VAWA was not a proper exercise of the Com
merce Clause, but also that it could not be upheld under Section
5113 because it aimed to regulate private activity only, and in so
doing, punished only private actors.114 Thus, Section 5 power can
only be used to reach state actors.
The language of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke stating that Title VII was passed pursuant to both Section 5
and the Commerce Clause115 is not to the contrary. The definition
of "employer" does not exclude state governments from Title VII
coverage. The states, however, have sovereign immunity unless
that immunity is validly abrogated by Congress. While Congress
cannot validly abrogate the states' sovereign immunity through leg
islation under the Commerce Clause, it can do so through its Sec
tion 5 power.u 6 Thus, both the commerce power and Section 5
were needed to pass Title VII: the commerce power was needed
because the Section 5 power cannot reach private conduct, and the
Section 5 power was needed because the commerce power cannot
be used to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
110. See also id. at 782 & n.6 (pointing out that a majority is of the opinion that
the Section 5 power is not limited to state action).
111. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,621-22 (2000).
112. Id. at 624.
113. Id. at 626 ("[VAWA] is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individ
uals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. ").
114. Id. at 627 ("Congress' power under [Section] 5 does not extend to the enact
ment of [VAWA].").
115. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978) ("Title VII
was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and [Section] 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
116. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001)
("Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I. . . . Congress mayL however,]
subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid
exercise of its [Section] 5 power." (citations omitted».
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While the Court has divided over Section 5 since Morrison, the
passel of later cases have involved only the question of whether
Congress could properly abrogate states' sovereign immunity with
Section 5 antidiscrimination legislation. 117 These cases have not in
volved private employers and, thus, even the decisions that upheld
the use of Section 5 as a basis for civil rights legislation 118 did not
affect the holding of Morrison and the earlier cases that the Court
in Morrison relied on. Morrison, then, appears to have the last
word as to whether Section 5 can be used to regulate private activ
ity; with the answer being-as demonstrated above-no.1 19
II.

CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO REGULATE
SMALL EMPLOYERS

This Part argues that the Court's decision in Arbaugh assumes
that Congress has the power to regulate employers regardless of
how many employees they have. This conclusion proceeds as a log
ical conclusion of principles of American government regarding ju
dicial power to entertain cases and congressional power to legislate.
The key to the argument will be demonstrating the link between
Congress's substantive legislative jurisdiction and the federal
courts' judicial jurisdiction.120

117. See id. (holding that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate state sover
eign immunity); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (stating that
Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity); Nev. Dep't of Human
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 (2003) (stating that the FMLA validly abrogated state
sovereign immunity).
118. See Lane, 541 U.S. 509; Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721.
119. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
120. The link between the power of these two bodies has been noted by courts
before, though in less express terms than proposed here. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) ("[T]he Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Con
gress [the power in question], and therefore [the statute] cannot grant jurisdiction
...."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,571-78 (1992) (dismissing a suit on
congressionally created generalized grievance for lack of Article III standing); Verlin
den B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,491-97 (1983) (holding that because Con
gress passed valid legislation pursuant to its foreign commerce power, it could grant
jurisdiction over those cases); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 351 (1911)
("[T]he jurisdiction of the court to entertain the proceeding, .. depends upon whether
the jurisdiction conferred is within the power of Congress ...."); Osborn v. Bank of the
U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) ("[W]hen a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original
cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause
.... ").
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Congress is a body of limited legislative jurisdiction, its power
to pass laws being constrained by Article I of the Constitution.1 21
Most relevant here is Congress's power to create the lower federal
courts.122 Also explicit is Congress's right to determine the subject
matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by granting jurisdic
tion over certain classes of cases.123 However, Congress cannot ex
ercise the power to grant jurisdiction over a class of cases unless it
does so pursuant to one of its enumerated powers, such as the Com
merce Clause. 124 In other words, if Congress has no constitutional
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress's power has been expanded beyond its
original bounds by some of the amendments to the Constitution, notably Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
122. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
123. E.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850) ("Congress, having the
power to establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdictions.").
124. This is not an uncontroversial assertion. There seems, in fact, to be some
understanding that it is not true at all. For instance, a number of courts have held that
jurisdictional elements do not impact the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
'jurisdictional element' of the statute ... is 'jurisdictional' only in the shorthand sense
that without that nexus, there can be no federal crime under the bombing statute. It is
not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction." (cita
tion omitted». Further, it might be argued that supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (2000), cuts against my position on the link between federal jurisdiction and
legislative power because it permits federal courts to hear state cases over which Con
gress would have no power so long as they are sufficiently related to the federal claims
at issue.
Without attempting to fully resolve the argument here, I note that it seems rather
inconsistent to impose federalism limitations on Congress alone. If the brand of feder
alism created in the Constitution is meant to preserve the power of the states as the
primary sources of power and authority over Americans, then permitting federal courts
to exercise power where Congress cannot would seem to undercut those federalism
ideals. Professor Laura Fitzgerald criticized a similar problem in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence: its tendency to give lip service to the idea that jurisdictional issues must
be resolved before merits questions while actually putting the merits issues first. This is
problematic because the Constitution grants only limited powers to the federal govern
ment. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1207, 1273
(2001) ("The Court's merits-first jurisdictional tradition ... collides with some of the
Constitution's most basic separation of powers values. At the heart of these is the prin
ciple that all federal power is profoundly limited: that the Constitution's three gov
erning institutions may use power only if and when affirmatively authorized to do so by
that power's source."). Erie Railroad, Co. v. Tompkins might also provide support for
this understanding. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the
Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REv.
79, 117 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court justified Erie constitutionally by "im
porting into Article III the Article I limits on congressional authority" (citing Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938))).
There has apparently been little judicial or scholarly attention paid to this particu
lar area of federal governmental structure. Judith Resnik has noted that, while com
mentary has focused on the issue of whether Congress can act as a "predator"
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power to regulate in a certain area, then it has no constitutional
power to grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases in that
area.
Further, just as Congress has limited legislative jurisdiction, it
is a commonplace of the American judicial system that the federal
courts have only limited subject-matter jurisdiction. 125 Article III
of the Constitution lays out the only matters over which the federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction.1 26 However, Article III is a ceiling
on federal court jurisdiction, not a floor. That is, it sets the maxi
mum power that Congress can grant to the courtS.127 Thus, if Con
gress has not granted jurisdiction over a class of cases, then the
federal courts have no right to exercise jurisdiction over those
cases. This conclusion can be restated in terms similar to the con
clusion reached above: If Congress has no power to grant jurisdic
tion over a class of cases,128 then the federal courts have no power
to exercise jurisdiction over those cases.
To recap, if the Constitution does not grant Congress the
power to regulate in a certain area, then Congress cannot grant ju
risdiction to the federal courts over cases in that area. Further, if
Congress cannot grant jurisdiction over cases in a certain area, then
the federal courts have no power to exercise jurisdiction over cases
in that area. Combining these two statements results in the follow
ing proposition: If Congress has no power to regulate in an area,
then the courts will not be able to exercise judicial jurisdiction over
cases in that area. This conclusion can also be expressed in a posi
tive fashion. That is, if the federal courts did have the power to
(jurisdiction-stripping), recent Supreme Court cases have focused on whether Congress
had conveyed too much authority to the federal courts. Judith Resnik, The Federal
Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86
GEO. L.J. 2589, 2592-93 (1998). The cases Resnik cites, furthermore, are cases in which
the Court held that Congress had violated Article III, not Article I. See Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811 (1997) (Article III standing); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211
(1995) (holding that courts cannot be forced to reopen final judgments); Lujan v. De
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing).
125. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c1. 1.
127. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) ("[W]hen
a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution,
forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the
Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause ....").
128. This is essentially equivalent to "if Congress has not granted jurisdiction."
After all, if Congress has no power to grant jurisdiction, then it cannot legitimately
grant jurisdiction. Rephrased in the same terms as used in the text, Congress cannot
put itself in a situation where it has granted jurisdiction.
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exercise jurisdiction over cases in some area, then Congress must
have the power to regulate cases in that area. 129
Now recall Arbaugh's holding that the employee-numerosity
requirement of Title VII does not limit the jurisdiction of the fed
eral courtS.130 In other words, the federal courts have the power to
exercise jurisdiction over Title VII cases involving employers with
fewer than fifteen employeesPl Thus, applying the (positive) con
clusion reached above, because the federal courts have the power to
exercise jurisdiction over those cases,132 Congress must have the
power to regulate employers with fewer than fifteen employees.133
129. This statement is logically equivalent to the one established immediately
above. That is, if one statement is true, then so is the other; and if one statement is
false, then so is the other. If the equivalence of the two statements is not immediately
obvious, consider the following nonlegal example: the statement, "If it is raining, then it
is cloudy" is logically equivalent to the statement, "If it is not cloudy, then it is not
raining." If the first statement is true (that is, if it only rains when there are clouds),
then so is the second statement (for there can be no rain without clouds). If the first
statement is false (if there can be rain without clouds), then the second is similarly false
(because we cannot deduce a lack of rain from the absence of clouds).
130. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006); see supra text accompa
nying notes 42-50.
131. Note that this does not mean that a federal court has the discretion not to
dismiss a case against a small employer once it is presented with evidence that the
requirements of Title VII are not met. The statute still states that a small employer
cannot be held liable, and courts are bound to apply that statute faithfully. See
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 501 (discussing the distinction between merits and jurisdiction).
132. See infra text accompanying note 135.
133. Deriving this conclusion about Congress's constitutional power to legislate
from a case in which no constitutional issue is raised might seem to offend the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, that if the Court could decide the question without refer
ence to the Constitution, then it would. However, this objection misunderstands the
nature of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The doctrine speaks not to a court
addressing constitutional issues in general, but merely to the question of choosing be
tween multiple interpretations of a statute, some of which raise issues of constitutional
ity. Justice Frankfurter described the doctrine as "the principle of constitutional
adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construc
tion may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another." United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)
("When the validity of an act of ... Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided."). In other words, if a court has two possible interpretations of a
statute before it and one would raise questions about the constitutionality of the statute
while the other would not, then the court should choose the interpretation that does not
raise the constitutional issue. The Arbaugh Court had no such choice in front of it.
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. It could either decide that the employee-numerosity require
ment was jurisdictional or was not. Id. The Court did not consider whether either
interpretation would raise issues of the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 510-16.
Furthermore, the idea that the Court is reluctant to speak on constitutional issues
may actually support my argument. The core idea presented here is that the Court
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CONGRESS'S POWER TO REGULATE ANY ACTIVITY

This Part extends the conclusion reached in Part II to the juris
dictional element of Title VII. It concludes, using the same reason
ing that was applied in Part II, that as a logical consequence of the
rule in Arbaugh, Congress has the power to regulate employers
even if they have no link to interstate commerce. This conclusion,
after Lopez and Morrison (and even after Raich), should be rather
surprising. Part IV will go on to explore potential explanations
rooted in the existing Commerce Clause precedent for this appar
ent broad understanding of Congress's commerce power.
A.

Is Congress's Power to ReguLate SmaLL EmpLoyers Surprising?

The conclusion reached in Part II, that the decision in Arbaugh
implicitly stated that Congress has the power to regulate employers
regardless of their size, begs the question: Has anything new been
said about the scope of federal legislative power? Perhaps it was
always understood that Congress could regulate regardless of the
size of the employer. After all, it is likely that the employee-numer
osity requirement was never intended to express Congress's inabiL
ity to regulate smaller employers, but rather Congress's lack of
wiLLingness to do so. Only two members of Congress are on record
as supporting the view that the employee-numerosity requirement
is in place to establish the constitutionality of Title VII, and neither
of those members supported the statute. 134 Further, if Congress
cannot regulate employers smaller than a certain size, then there
decided a significant constitutional issue without explicitly mentioning it. If it is ac
cepted that the Court has an institutional norm of avoiding mentioning constitutional
issues, then perhaps the idea that the Court decided a constitutional issue without say
ing so becomes more palatable. The argument, however, does not depend on whether
the Court knew or did not know what it was doing. If one believes that the Court
understood the implications of the decision pointed out here, then Arbaugh can be read
as illustrating the Court's conscious understanding of the nature of employment and the
breadth of the Commerce Clause. If one believes, on the other hand, that the Court did
not realize the implications explained here, then Arbaugh can be read as illustrating the
Court's unconscious understanding of the Commerce Clause. That is, perhaps the
Court has such a deep, innate understanding of employment as an economic activity
and Congress's very broad power to regulate economic activity that the issues raised
here do not even occur to the Justices.
134. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 108 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2475 (statements of the separate minority views of the Honorable Richard H. Poff and
the Honorable William Cramer) ("[The] theory is that the quantum of employees is a
rational yardstick by which the interstate commerce concept can be measured. Out of
thin air, the bill pulls a figure and determines that 25 employees is the magic number
not 26 or 24 but 25.").
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appears to be no justification for lowering that limit, as Congress
did in 1972, when it changed the requirement from twenty-five em
ployees to its current fifteen.1 35 Finally, if the employee-numerosity
requirement exists for constitutional purposes, then the purpose of
the jurisdictional element, limiting the coverage of the statute to
employers "engaged in an industry affecting commerce,"136 is not
clear. If the size of the employer is meant to serve as a proxy for
the effect on interstate commerce, then there is no reason to make
the affecting-commerce requirement explicit as well.
All of that said, after Morrison and Lopez, a reasonable fear
that Title VII might be found unconstitutional did in fact exist. 137
This would indicate that Congress's power to regulate even employ
ers who satisfied both the employee-numerosity requirement and
the jurisdictional element was in doubt. Thus, the revelation that
the Court implicitly understands that Congress can regulate em
ployers irrespective of their size may have significance in and of
itself.
More momentous, however, is that the same argument used to
show that the employee-numerosity requirement is not part of a
constitutional limitation on Congress can be applied to the jurisdic
tional element of Title VII. The result will be analogous: Congress
can regulate employers even if those employers have no effect on
interstate commerce. A major task will then be to reconcile this
broader and likely more surprising conclusion with the Court's still
controlling138 position on the Commerce Clause taken in Lopez
and Morrison.
B.

The Jurisdictional Element

To reach the ultimate result that Congress can regulate em
ployers even without a connection to interstate commerce, a poten
tial explanation for Part II's conclusion that Congress can regulate
small employers must be fleshed out.
135. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86
Stat. 103, 103. It might be argued that the lower limit is consistent with the idea of the
employee-numerosity requirement as a proxy for an effect on interstate commerce.
However, this argument will become less viable as shipping and cross-border communi
cation become cheaper and more efficient. It is no longer true that only the biggest
businesses have an effect on interstate commerce.
136. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (2000).
137. See Bagenstos, supra note 3; Boudreaux, supra note 3; Law, supra note 3;
Leonard, supra note 3; Oleske, supra note 3; Rubenfeld, supra note 3; Virelli & Leibo
witz, supra note 3.
138. See, e.g., Kreit, supra note 75.
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Congress relied on two powers to enact its civil rights legisla
tion: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause. 139 It is rather easy, however, to dismiss the Section 5 power
as a possible source of congressional regulation of small employers.
Morrison makes clear that Congress can only regulate state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment, including Section 5. 140 Thus,
it is highly unlikely that private employers, regardless of size
or connection to interstate commerce, can be regulated under
Section 5.1 41
This leaves the Commerce Clause as the only source of power
under which Congress can be said to have regulatory authority over
small employers. After Lopez and Morrison, however, with their
nondeferential scrutiny of congressional action under the Com
merce Clause, it may be surprising to find that Congress retains the
power to regulate very small local businesses that may not have an
obvious connection to interstate commerce.
The jurisdictional element of Title VII may provide reconcilia
tion of Congress's ability to regulate small employers with the
Court's stance in Lopez and Morrison. Recall that the definition of
"employer" contains not just the employee-numerosity require
ment,142 but also demands that the putative employer be "engaged
in an industry affecting commerce."143 This appears to be precisely
the type of jurisdictional element that the Lopez and Morrison
opinions decried the absence of in the statutes challenged in those
cases.1 44 The presence of the jurisdictional element in Title VII in
dicates that perhaps the Court would not be concerned about the
number of employees an employer has in a potential constitutional
139. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978)
("Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and
[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Recall that the Section 5 power serves to
justify regulating state government employers. See supra text accompanying notes 115
116.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 111-119.
141. See supra Part I.C (describing the Supreme Court's Section 5 jurisprudence
with respect to Congress's ability to regulate private activity under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
142. See 42 U.s.c. § 2000e(a) (2000) ("The term 'employer' means a person ...
who has fifteen or more employees ....").
143. [d.
144. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Like the [statute] at
issue in Lopez, [VAWA] contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal
cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.");
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[The statute] contains no jurisdic
tional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos
session in question affects interstate commerce. ").
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challenge to the statute. 145 So long as that employer has the re
quired nexus to interstate commerce, it will fall in Lopez and Mor
rison's third category of realms Congress can validly regulate under
the Commerce Clause: "those activities having a substantial rela
tion to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. "146 In other words, the jurisdictional
element would serve precisely the purpose such elements are sup
posed to serve: It would ensure that any adjudication made by a
federal court in a Title VII case has the requisite connection to in
terstate commerce such that exercise of federal power is legitimate
under the Constitution. 147
The problem with using the jurisdictional element of Title VII
to square Congress's power to regulate small employers with Lopez
and Morrison finds its foundation in the Arbaugh opinion. The
Court used Arbaugh not merely to declare that the employee
numerosity requirement in Title VII did not describe a limitation
on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, but also as a
vehicle to proclaim a broad bright-line rule: 148 "[W]hen Congress
does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional,
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in charac
ter."149 Taking this rule at face value, the jurisdictional element of
Title VII, limiting the statute's effect to businesses "engaged in an
industry affecting commerce,"150 cannot be said to limit the jurisdic
tion of the federal courts.1 51 Nowhere does Title VII say that the
federal courts shall only have jurisdiction over cases in which the
employer is engaged in an industry affecting commerce. Rather, it
merely states that an employer is someone who, among other re
quirements, has the requisite effect on interstate commerce. The
jurisdictional element modifies only who is affected by the statute,
not the courts' power to adjudicate. Thus, the jurisdictional ele
ment in Title VII does not satisfy the bright-line rule set out in
145. See also text accompanying notes 134-136.
146. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting Lo
pez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
147. See also supra note 23.
148. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006).
149. Id.
150. 42 U.s.C. § 2000e(a) (2000).
151. That a jurisdictional element might not limit the jurisdiction of a court seems
counterintuitive, but it must be remembered that there are two separate institutions in
play, each with its own set of jurisdictional issues. Jurisdictional elements ensure that
statutes are validly applied only to those parties who are within Congress's legislative
jurisdiction. The judicial jurisdiction of the federal courts is not necessarily affected by
these jurisdictional elements, as Arbaugh made clear.
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Arbaugh and therefore does not limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 152
Even if straightforward application of Arbaugh's bright-line
rule did not settle the matter, the Court's reasoning in Arbaugh can
also be applied to the jurisdictional element. Indeed, each of the
two arguments the Court made in favor of declaring the employee
numerosity requirement to be nonjurisdictional can be made with
the same force for the jurisdictional element. First, the jurisdic
tional element and the jurisdiction-granting provision appear in
separate sections of the statute, just as the employee-numerosity
requirement is separate from the jurisdiction-granting provision. 153
This would imply that Congress did not intend the jurisdictional el
ement to limit the jurisdiction of the courts. If Congress did so in
tend, why would it not draft the statute so that the jurisdictional
grant itself contained the limitation? Second, if the jurisdictional
element did limit the federal courts' jurisdiction, a defendant might
raise the issue that it was not engaged in an industry affecting com
merce until sometime after entry of judgment for the plaintiff, thus
effecting the same "unfairness" and "waste of judicial resources"
cited by the Court with respect to the employee-numerosity re
quirement. 154 Thus, whether the bright-line rule is applied directly
to the jurisdictional element or whether the reasoning of the Court
in Arbaugh is invoked, the same result is reached: The jurisdic
tional element, requiring that employers be "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce,"155 does not actually limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.

152. Here the terminology may begin to get a little confusing. After all, how
could a "jurisdictional element" not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts? One
must recall that we are speaking of the jurisdiction of two separate bodies: the legisla
tive jurisdiction of Congress and the judicial jurisdiction (or subject-matter jurisdiction)
of the federal courts. Congress includes a jurisdictional element in a statute to ensure
that the only subjects of that statute are those that Congress may validly regulate. In
other words, the word "jurisdictional" in "jurisdictional element" refers to Congress's
legislative jurisdiction, its power to regulate, not to the courts' judicial jurisdiction.
153. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 ("[T]he IS-employee threshold appears in a
separate provision that 'does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction of the district courts.'" (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385, 394 (1982))).
154. ld.
155. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b).
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Congress Can Regulate Employers with No Effect on
Interstate Commerce

The jurisdictional element of Title VII has thus been shown to
be analogous to the employee-numerosity requirement in that
neither can be said to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Therefore, the jurisdictional element is susceptible to the same ar
gument as that made regarding the employee-numerosity require
ment in Part II. That is, it can be shown that just as Congress can
regulate employers regardless of whether they meet the fifteen-em
ployee threshold, so Congress can regulate employers regardless of
whether they meet the "affecting commerce" standard. The argu
ment proceeds, in much briefer form than was used in Part II, in the
following way.
First, if Congress has no power to regulate employers not en
gaged in an industry with an effect on interstate commerce, then it
has no power to grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases in
volving such employers,156 Second, if Congress has no power to
grant jurisdiction over cases involving employers not engaged in an
industry with an effect on interstate commerce, then the federal
courts have no power to exercise jurisdiction over those cases. 157
Thus, combining those two statements, if Congress has no
power to regulate employers not engaged in an industry with an
effect on interstate commerce, then the federal courts have no
power to exercise jurisdiction over such cases. 158 But, as before,
this is equivalent to the positive statement that if the federal courts
do have the power to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving em
ployers not engaged in an industry with an effect on interstate com
merce, then Congress must have the power to regulate such
employers. 159
Finally, the Court in Arbaugh said that a limiting element in a
statute must be clearly labeled as jurisdictional in order to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courtS.160 The jurisdictional element in
Title VII is not expressly labeled as jurisdictional. Therefore, the
jurisdictional element does not pass the bright-line test, and thus
does not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The denoue
ment is that since federal courts do have power over these purely
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See also supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
See also supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
See also supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
See also supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
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intrastate employers, Congress must have constitutional authority
to regulate them.
To reiterate, the argument presented above is precisely the
same as the argument presented in Part II. The only difference is
the subject of the argument: in Part II, the subject was the em
ployee-numerosity requirement; here, the subject was the jurisdic
tional element. Thus, Congress has the power to regulate
employers even if they are not engaged in an industry with an effect
on interstate commerce.
IV.

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BROAD UNDERSTANDING
OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER

Having established that Arbaugh's bright-line rule implies that
Congress can regulate employers regardless of their connection to
interstate commerce, the task is to square that with the existing
Commerce Clause precedent; specifically, Lopez, Morrison, and
Raich. I first argue in this Part that the distinctions used by Justice
Stevens in Raich to show why the CSA should not fall victim to the
same reasoning as the Gun-Free School Zone Act (in Lopez) or
VAWA's civil remedy (in Morrison) do not apply to Title VII. I
then argue that the understanding of Arbaugh is really less about
broad federal power to regulate than it is a separation of powers
question: Which branch is to determine what is economic and what
is not?161 If Arbaugh means what it logically implies, then the
Court has essentially ceded the authority to determine what activi
ties are economic back to Congress.
A.

Using Raich to Explain Congress's Power to Regulate Purely
Intrastate Employers

A surprising conclusion has been reached regarding Congress's
power to regulate. The earlier attempt to reconcile the conclusion
that Congress can regulate small employers by relying on the juris
dictional element ran into the problem that the phrasing of the ju
161. The links between the "federalism revolution" as represented by Lopez and
Morrison and separation of powers questions have been explored by a few writers. See,
e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574 AN
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (2001); Melissa Irr, Note, United States v. Mor
rison: An Analysis of the Diminished Effect of Congressional Findings in Commerce

Clause Jurisprudence and a Criticism of the Abandonment of the Rational Basis Test, 62
U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2001). But see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution that Wasn't,
99 Nw. U. L. REV. 47 (2004) (arguing that there was no separation of powers
revolution).
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risdictional element combined with the bright-line rule in Arbaugh
demonstrate that the jurisdictional element is not actually neces
sary. However, Title VII's constitutionality apparently does not
rely on an employer's effect on interstate commerce any more than
it relies on the size of the employer. While this outcome seems con
trary to Lopez and Morrison, it might still be reconciled with the
recent Commerce Clause cases if the distinctions between Raich, on
the one hand, and Morrison and Lopez, on the other, are drawn
out.
The first potential explanation regarding how Congress might
have the constitutional authority to regulate employers of any size
regardless of their lack of nexus to interstate commerce lies in the
Raich decision. Raich distinguished the CSA from the statutes in
question in Lopez and Morrison in two major ways. First, the CSA
regulates activity that is "quintessentially economic,"162 in contrast
to the noneconomic activity regulated in Lopez and Morrison. 163
Second, the CSA was characterized as a comprehensive statute reg
ulating interstate and international commerce, of which only a small
but essential portion was challenged; however, Lopez and Morrison
dealt with discrete regulations of specific activity.l64
The first distinction provides a possible parallel between Title
VII and the CSA. It seems very likely that regulation of employ
ment, as undertaken by Title VII, is regulation of an economic ac
tivity.165 After all, even if a firm does not engage in activity that
162. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
163. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Gender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[The statute in question] is a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms.").
164. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25 ("[T]he CSA ... was a lengthy and detailed statute
creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution, and
possession of five classes of 'controlled substances.' ... [The classification of marijuana
as a Schedule I drug], unlike the discrete prohibition established by the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, was merely one of many 'essential part[s] of a larger regula
tion of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated.''' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561) (alteration in
original)).
165. Certainly employment would fall under the Raich definition of "economic":
"'production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.''' Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DlcrlONARY 720 (1966)); see also
Adams v. Suozzi, 433 F.3d 220, 226 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[N]o extended discussion is re
quired to show that employment agreements ... 'evidence[ ] a transaction involving
commerce.''' (quoting 9 U.S.c. § 2 (2000)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
While Justice O'Connor takes issue with the majority's definition, stating that
"[t]he [majority's] definition of economic activity is breathtaking," Raich, 545 U.S. at 49
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might be referred to as "economic" or "commercial" (for example,
a nonprofit think tank), an employee working at such firm is en
gaged in the production of wages for herself. Even a court commit
ted to closely scrutinizing Congress's determinations of whether an
activity is fairly regulable under the Commerce Clause would not
be likely to challenge that assertion. 166
Under the fair assumption that the Court understands employ
ment to be an economic activity, Arbaugh may be merely consistent
with Raich, adding nothing new to the boundaries of Congress's
legislative power. That is, it might be said that Raich itself already
established the principle that legislation under the Commerce
Clause may be constitutional even without a jurisdictional element
or any other limiting principle, so long as the regulated activity is
clearly economic in nature. 167 On this view, Arbaugh simply reaf
firms the Raich principle that Congress does not need limiting ele
ments, such as an employee-numerosity requirement or a
jurisdictional element, to regulate under Title VII because employ
ment is an economic activity.
The difficulty with that argument is that Raich did not merely
rely on the economic nature of growing marijuana for its distinction
from Lopez and Morrison, but it also relied on the comprehensive
ness of the CSA.1 68 The CSA regulates intrastate activity merely as
a necessary consequence of its larger regulation of enormous
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), she shies away from actually providing her own definition,
just as neither Lopez nor Morrison provided a definition. The closest Justice O'Connor
comes to a definition is the statement that "economic activity usually relates directly to
commercial activity." Id. at 50. This achieves nothing more than a substitution of the
undefined word "commercial" for the undefined word "economic." See Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-98 (1936) ("What is commerce? The term, as this
court many times has said, is one of extensive import. No all-embracing definition has
ever been formulated.").
166. But see Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition
and Reason in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 567-74 (2001) (dis
cussing a variety of definitions of "economic activity" that the Court might be using and
noting that the Court did not, in either Morrison or Lopez, define what it meant by
"economic activity").
167. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing the Court's lack of
concern with both jurisdictional elements and legislative history in finding an effect on
interstate commerce).
168. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 ("Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive
legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was act
ing well within its authority to 'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper' to
'regulate Commerce ... among the several States.' That the regulation ensnares some
purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we
refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme." (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8».
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amounts of interstate and international activity.169 Title VII, how
ever, is arguably not the kind of comprehensive regulation of com
merce represented by the CSA.170 It is, rather, a statute with one
aim: to prohibit discrimination in employment based on certain ver
boten categories. l7l It is thus in that regard more like Morrison's
disputed VAWA provision, the only aim of which was to provide a
civil rights remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence, and Lo
pez's Gun-Free School Zones Act, which, in the words of the Raich
majority, was a "brief, single-subject statute making it a crime for
an individual to possess a gun in a school zone,"l72 than it is like the
CSA, which the Court in Raich described as "a lengthy and detailed
statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating ... con
trolled substances. "173
If Title VII is viewed as a statute with a single aim, then
Arbaugh is no mere corollary of Raich. The Raich majority relied
169. See id. at 23 ("[W]e have often reiterated that '[w]here the class of activities
is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power "to excise, as trivial, individual instances" of the class.'" (quoting Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971))).
170. Nor, for that matter, is the ADA, the ADEA, or the FMLA. See supra note
22.
171. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac
tice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....").
172. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23.
173. Id. at 24. It might be fairly argued that Title VII is not a single-subject stat
ute but is rather a piece of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964 that covers
various topics. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 1,78 Stat. 241,241-42
(amending 42 U.S.c. § 1971) (voting rights); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 2, 78 Stat. at
243-46 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000a to a-6) (discrimination in places of public accom
modation); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 4, 78 Stat. at 246-49 (codified at 42 U.S.c.
§§ 2000c to c-9) (desegregation of public education); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 6, 78
Stat. at 252-53 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000d to d-4a) (discrimination in federally as
sisted programs). Justice O'Connor made an analogous argument in her dissent in
Raich, as she believed that the majority should have focused on the activity actually
regulated rather than on the CSA as a whole. Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("To ascertain whether Congress' encroachment is constitutionally justified
in this case, then, I would focus here on the personal cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes."). If Title VII is in fact seen as more analogous to
the CSA than to the statutes in Morrison and Lopez, then the outcome of Arbaugh
pointed out in this Article is merely consistent with Raich.
That said, the CSA was not merely labeled as comprehensive, but the challenged
portion of that statute was also considered essential to the operation of the rest of the
statute. It is not clear that the same applies to Title VII when considered as a portion of
the larger Civil Rights Act of 1964. It seems unlikely that the voting rights portion of
the Civil Rights Act would be undermined by a repeal of Title VII.
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on economic activity, in part, and on breadth of regulation to distin
guish Lopez and Morrison. Title VII may only lay claim to the for
mer distinction, and yet Arbaugh implies that it is not only
constitutional as written, but would be constitutional even upon re
moval of the employee-numerosity requirement and jurisdictional
element. In contrast, a hypothetical Title VII drafted without an
employee-numerosity requirement and without a jurisdictional ele
ment would not automatically be found constitutional under the
Raich analysis because of its similarity to VAWA and the Gun-Free
School Zones Act as a single-subject statute. Thus, because
Arbaugh did in fact implicitly provide for the constitutionality of
such a statute, a source beyond Raich must be sought for the basis
of the Court's understanding that neither an employee-numerosity
requirement nor a jurisdictional element are necessary to justify the
constitutionality of this single-subject statute.
B.

Judicial Permissiveness of Regulation of Economic Activity

Arbaugh's consequences have been shown to be not only
somewhat contrary to Lopez and Morrison, but also to stretch be
yond the Court's decision in Raich. By deciding Arbaugh the way it
did, the Court may be signaling a new level of permissiveness to
ward congressional regulation of economic activity.
In stating that a holding that may permit Congress to regulate
employment regardless of size or effect on interstate commerce, the
Court pushed back against the spirit of the limitations it had im
posed in Lopez and Morrison. The driving force behind those cases
was that the Commerce Clause power was in danger of being ex
tended too far through aggressive use of aggregation arguments. In
Lopez, the government argued that violent crime near schools will
handicap education, which will in turn have a harmful effect on the
American economy.174 The Court rejected this argument for fear
that acceptance would allow Congress to regulate anything it
pieasedP5 The Court rejected a very similar argument in Morri
son, where the legislative history of VAWA stated that gender-moti
vated violence has a significant effect on interstate commerceP6
The Court was again concerned with the breadth with which Con
gress would be allowed to regulate if it permitted this aggregation
174. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995).
175. [d. at 564 ("[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.").
176. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
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argument to succeedY7 These concerns later came to be known as
the "non-infinity principle," referring to the Court's desire to avoid
interpretations of the Commerce Clause that would allow Congress
to regulate anything (thUS "infinity") it pleased. 178
By allowing for the constitutionality of Title VII even without a
jurisdictional element, Arbaugh might simply be saying that the
Court will not apply the non-infinity principle to economic activity,
regardless of whether that activity is regulated in a large, compre
hensive statute like the CSA, or in a more confined, single-subject
statute like Title VII. Thus, under Arbaugh, if an activity is deemed
economic, aggregation arguments will be accepted, making Con
gress's power to regulate that type of activity almost limitless.
C.

Defining "Economic"

Of course, the question of whether a regulated activity is actu
ally economic lurks in the background of that conclusion. If the
view is taken that employment is an indisputably economic activ
ityp9 then the outcome of Arbaugh is merely a somewhat surpris
ing extension of Raich: Congress can regulate any economic activity
it wants to whatever extent it desires. However, the Court in Lopez
asserted that, absent other considerations such as jurisdictional ele
ments or congressional findings, the economic nature of the regu
177. See id. ("[I]f Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be
able to regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-motivated violence,
as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the
larger class of which it is a part.").
178. The term appears to have been coined by David B. Kopel and Glenn H.
Reynolds in their article. David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism
Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REv. 59, 69
(1997) ("The second analytic principle that Lopez offers is one this Article calls the
'non-infinity principle.' In other words, for a Commerce Clause rationale to be accept
able under Lopez, it must not be a rationale that would allow Congress to legislate on
everything."); see also Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55
HASTINGS LJ. 573, 589 (2004) ("Because of the non-infinity principle, it would not be
enough to establish federal jurisdiction to show that a robber, for example, used a gun
that had traveled in interstate commerce."); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H.
Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence En
counters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253, 1260 (2003) ("[T]he Court indicated
that it was serious about enforcing the 'non-infinity principle' in the interpretation of
the Commerce Clause by looking with a jaundiced eye on any interpretation that would
effectively convert the Commerce Clause into a general police power."); Craig M.
Bradley, What Ever Happened to Federalism?, TRIAL, Aug. 2005, at 52, 54 ("[I]f I write
a note reminding my daughter to take out the garbage, the pencil or the notepad may
have traveled from another state, so my using them has an 'effect' on interstate com
merce. . .. The non-infinity principle narrows this focus to a reasonable one.").
179. See supra text accompanying notes 172-173.
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lated activity is the key to the constitutionality of legislation under
the Commerce Clause. 180 The Court, both in that case and in Mor
rison, seemed to take the primary place in determining whether an
activity was economic. Raich, despite quoting a dictionary for a
definition of "economic,"181 does nothing to soften this primary
placement, as the Court there explicitly decided that the CSA regu
lates economic activity.182
Somewhat paradoxically, an understanding of this situation al
lows the conclusions reached so far about Congress's power to reg
ulate to actually be expanded. That is, by employing the notion that
the economic nature of an activity is a decisive factor in determin
ing the constitutionality of a statute, Arbaugh can be read to say
that the Court is now conceding to Congress not only the power to
regulate any economic activity, but also the power to define what
activity is economic (thUS regulable). This is the separation of pow
ers oriented conclusion referred to above. It can be deduced from
Arbaugh that Title VII, even without a jurisdictional element, was
validly passed by Congress under its commerce power. The justifi
cation for this, consistent with Morrison, Lopez, and Raich, is that
employment, the activity regulated by Title VII, is economic. But
the court has not said that employment is an economic activity. In
order for the statute to be constitutional, someone must have made
a definitive determination that employment is an economic activity.
Since the Court has not spoken, that "someone" can only be Con
gress. Thus, the Court has implicitly stated that it would uphold
Title VII absent a jurisdictional element on the grounds that Con
gress believes employment is an economic activity.
But if that is true of Title VII, there is no principled reason why
it would not be true of any other statute Congress might wish to
pass. In other words, Congress, under this reading, need simply
regulate, and that regulation will serve as a signal to the Court that
Congress believes that the regulated activity is economic, and thus
180. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise ...."). The
Court has asserted the same type of authority in other contexts. For example, in decid
ing whether Congress properly abrogated state sovereign immunity through Section 5
legislation, the Court has examined the history of the statute for evidence that the legis
lative response to was "congruen[t] and proportional [to] the injury to be prevented or
remedied." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The Court believed that
it had "the responsibility ... , not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
181. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
182. [d. at 25-26.
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within the commerce power without a jurisdictional element or any
other limiting factor.
That Congress can determine its own jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause by simply legislating and regulating anything it
wants to seems somewhat outrageous. The power that the Court is
arguably granting to Congress is breathtakingly broad. The strong
role of the courts, particularly in the Commerce Clause area, will
have been reduced to nothing. Perhaps, then, a qualifier is due.
The specter of the innate understanding of employment as an eco
nomic activity haunts this entire analysis. The conclusion reached
above, that Congress can regulate anything it pleases under the
Commerce Clause, has to be tempered by the knowledge that the
base upon which it rests is, after all, Title VII, a statute regulating
an activity that is, as noted above, almost indisputably economic.
Perhaps the Court was comfortable with the consequences of its
decision precisely because it had an understanding of employment
as an economic activity, despite a lack of definitive adjudication to
that effect. In that case, a reexamination of the extreme conclusion
reached here is due. 183 Perhaps Congress, instead of having essen
tially limitless power, can actually regulate anything that can fairly
be said to be economic under the Commerce Clause. 184 This com
ports with Arbaugh itself because employment certainly can be
fairly argued to be economic. It also leaves room for the courts to
exercise some control over the scope of Congress's commerce
power, which control they are likely extremely reluctant to abdicate
completely.
The key understanding arising from Arbaugh, though, whether
the conclusion is the original broad one or the more tempered one
immediately above, remains the same, and is perhaps best ex
pressed by Justice Ginsburg's words for the Court in the Arbaugh
opinion: "[W]e think it the sounder course ... to leave the ball in
Congress' court."185
183. The desire for a reexamination based on our understanding of employment
as an economic activity, however, does not change the underlying logic of the analysis.
That is, whether or not Title VII is the foundation on which the Court built Arbaugh,
the same chain of reasoning still leads from that decision to the conclusion that Con
gress can regulate anything under the Commerce Clause. In other words, the argument
made here is statute-independent. Everything follows from the Court's statement of its
broadly applicable bright-line rule, not from any inherent properties of Title VII or
employment.
184. Nothing rides on the precise form of the language chosen to limit the scope
of the conclusion. Certainly other phraseology could be equally as appropriate.
185. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006).
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CONCLUSION

Arbaugh, a seemingly innocuous case about a distinction Uuris
diction versus merits) that is certainly important but hardly world
changing, turns out to have enormous consequences if its conclu
sion is followed to its logical ends. Because of the constitutional
limitations on the power of the federal courts to exercise jurisdic
tion and the power of the Congress to regulate, stating that the fed
eral courts do have jurisdiction to hear a dispute is equivalent to
saying that Congress granted those courts that jurisdiction, which is
in turn equivalent to saying that Congress has the power to regulate
in the area of the dispute.
The Court in Arbaugh read Title VII to mean that the federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear cases even where the employer has
fewer than fifteen employees, and also implicitly decided that fed
eral courts can hear disputes even where the employer has not the
slightest relation to interstate commerce. Thus, Congress has the
power to regulate small employers, even those without the slightest
connection to interstate commerce. Carrying this one step further,
there is no principled reason to differentiate between employment
and any other activity given employment's status as an activity that
has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court in the post-Lopez
era to be economic. However, realism and a reminder that employ
ment is almost certainly an economic activity within the under
standing of the Supreme Court temper this extreme conclusion,
leaving in its stead a slightly more limited one: Congress can, pursu
ant to the logical consequences of Arbaugh, regulate anything that
can be fairly argued to be economic under the Commerce Clause.

